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COMMENTS
ranty of merchantability of the same statute offers an alternative
theory by which the purchaser of unwholesome canned or pack-
aged goods can recover against the retailer.ls
If it is postulated that the imposition of liability under implied
warranty is a matter of policy, it seems clear that the decision on
the issue in the principal case could be made either way because
there are valid arguments on both sides. It is, however, sub-
mitted that the reasoning in the principal case is to a certain
extent faulty. To state categorically that the wholesaler should
be liable if the retailer is liable does not take into consideration
the fact that the profit margin of the wholesaler is smaller than
that of either the retailer or the manufacturer and the fact that
the wholesaler probably has even less opportunity than the re-
tailer to inspect the goods.
TORTS - LABEL OF "COMMUNIST DOMINATED"
HELD LIBELOUS PER SE
An officer of defendant organization mailed a letter and mime-
ographed enclosures to members of the organization's board of
directors and to certain newspapers. The mimeographed enclo-
sures dealt with the qualifications of candidates for election and
in the course of discussion referred to plaintiff organization as
being Communist dominated. In plaintiff's suit for libel the dis-
trict court awarded judgment for the plaintiff. On appeal, held:
affirmed. To write that an organization is Communist dominated
is to subject such organization to public hatred and contempt, to
its immediate harm, and is, therefore, "libelous per se."'
A publication is said to be defamatory if it tends to injure the
reputation of another so as to lower him in the estimation of the
community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing
with him,2 and that criterion is appropriate whether the defama-
tion takes the form of libel or slander.3 Whereas, in the law of
N.E. 27 (1934). For a collection of cases in point, see Notes, 142 A.L.R 1434
(1943), 90 A.L.R. 1269 (1934).
18. Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, 255 N.Y. 388, 175 N.E. 105
(1931).
1. Utah State Farm Bureau Federation v. National Farmers Service
Corp., 198 F.2d 20 (10th Cir. 1952).
2. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Commission v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123
(1951); RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 559 (1938).
3. McCoRMIcK, DAMAGES, 415419 (1935); Carpenter, Defamation-
Libel and Special Damages, 7 ORE. L. REV. 353 (1928); Green, Relational
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slander, "per se" is used to denote those cases in which special
damages need not be shown,4 originally, "per se" was not applied
to libel cases since libel was actionable at common law without
proof of any damage.5 Some American courts, however, have dis-
tinguished between a writing defamatory on its face and a writ-
ing which can be demonstrated to be defamatory only by the use
of innuendo, the "per se" label being attached in the former
but not in the latter situation. Except for pleading purposes, the
distinction had no legal significance since proof of special dam-
ages was not considered necessary in either case.6 Other Ameri-
can courts draw the same distinction but hold that, where the
defamatory meaning must be proved by innuendo, special dam-
ages must be pleaded and proved.7 The court in the principal
case makes no mention of whether special damages are necessary
but merely labels the words "Communist dominated" as "libelous
per se." Thus it is not discernible whether the court is following
any of the above views. The court, however, introduces an ap-
parently new meaning of the phrase "libelous per se," i. e., libel-
ous as a matter of law, leaving to the jury only the issues of
whether the libelous statement was true or false, and if false,
whether its publication resulted in damage to the plaintiff. The
general rule in defamation cases is that the court determines
whether the communication is capable of a defamatory meaning,
and the jury decides whether the communication was understood
in a defamatory sense by those hearing it." By ruling as a matter
of law that the communication was libelous per se, the court in
Interests, 31 ILm. L. REv. 35, 47-48 (1936); Notes, 14 CALiF. L. REV. 61
(1925); 38 Micn. L. Rav. 253 (1939).
4. From the rule that slander, in general, is actionable only by proof of
actual damages, the courts very early developed certain specific exceptions-
the imputation of crime, or a loathsome disease, and those imputations
affecting the plaintiff in his business, trade, profession, office or calling-
which required no proof of damage. Modern statutes have added a fourth
category, the imputation of unchastity to a woman. PRossFa, ToRTs 798
(1941).
5. Id. at 793.
6. Erwin v. Record Publ. Co., 154 Cal. 79, 97 Pac. 21 (1908).
7. Landstrom v. Thorpe, 189 F.2d 46 (8th Cir. 1951); Del Rico Co., v.
New Mexican, Inc., 56 N.M. 538, 246 P.2d 206 (1952); O'Connell v. Press
Pub]. Co., 214 N.Y. 352, 108 N.E. 556 (1915).
8. RESTATEAVENT, ToRTs § 614 (1938). When deciding whether a com-
munication is slander per se the court determines whether the imputed
crime or disease is of such a character as to be actionable per se, while
the jury decides whether imputed conduct or attributes of character are
incompatible with the proper conduct of plaintiff's business, trade or pro-
fession. Id. § 615.
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the principal cases recognized that the label of Communist domi-
nated today could only be understood in a defamatory sense.9
This decision is representative of the weight of authority, 10 which
declares that the label of Communist is objectionable today to
most people since it refers to a person advocating disobedience
to the laws and forcible appropriation of the property of others.
With respect to the other kind of defamation, slander, the
question arises as to whether the label of Communist is slander-
ous per se.' Recent legislation-2 and decisions' 3 reveal a tendency
of the courts to treat membership'14 in the Communist Party as
9. Accord, Wright v. Farm Journal, 158 F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 1947), where
the court held writing that a person is a Communist to be libelous per se,
and that the only function of the jury was to decide whether the publication
is true or false. In the following cases, however, the court left to the jury
the question of whether writing that a person is a Communist was under-
stood in a defamatory sense. Gallagher v. Chavalas, 48 Cal. App. 2d 52,
119 P.2d 408 (1941); Levy v. Gelver, 175 Misc. 746, 25 N.Y.S.2d 148 (Sup.
Ct. 1941).
10. Wright v. Farm Journal, 158 F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 1947); Gallagher v.
Chavalas, 48 Cal. App. 2d 52, 119 P.2d 408 (1941) ; Levy v. Gelver, 175 Misc.
746, 25 N.Y.S.2d 148 (Sup. Ct. 1941). Contra: McAndrew v. Scranton Re-
publican Publ. Co., 364 Pa. 504, 72 A.2d 780 (1950).
A very complete list of terms held to be defamatory of a person's political
and patriotic status appears in WITTENBERG, DANGEROUS WORDS, 307-308
(1947).
11. In the case of Keefe v. O'Brien, 116 N.Y.S.2d 286 (Sup. Ct. 1952), the
court held that calling a person a "Communist" did not reflect on his ability
to earn a living in that the epithet was not made in that context, it did not
impute unchastity nor loathsome disease, and it did not charge a crime-
at least under the presently understood interpretation of the Smith Act.
12. The Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, § 8, subdivision (i),
54 STAT. 892 (1940), declares the expressed policy of Congress that vacanies
caused by the induction of employees into the army "shall not be filled by
person who is a member of the Communist Party or the German-American
Bund."
The Emergency Relief Appropriation Act of 1941, § 15, 54 STAT. 611(1941), prohibited relief employment to any "Communist" or "member of
and Nazi Bund organization." This provision was held invalid in United
States v. Schneider, 45 F. Supp. 848 (E.D.Wis. 1942), on the ground that
there was no reasonable connection between political beliefs and financial
distress. The court, however, did sustain that part of the indictment which
charged falsification of facts in concealing Communist membership.
The New York Civil Service Law, § 12-a, bars persons who advocate the
overthrow of the Government from any civil service position. Communists
are grouped under this category.
13. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Blau v. United States,
"40 U.S. 159 (1950).
14. J. Edgar Hoover before a congressional subcommittee:
Even though there are only 54,174 members in the party, the fact that
the party leaders themselves boast that for every party member there are
10 others who follow the party line and who are ready, willing, and able
to do the party's work. In other words, there is a potential fifth column
of 540,000 people dedicated to this philosophy.
Hearings before Subcomnittee of the Senate Committee an Appropriations,
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a crime. Expressive of this tendency is Blau v. United States,15
where the defendant refused, before a grand jury, to answer
questions about her membership in the Communist Party and
her knowledge of its affairs. Relying upon the indictment l6 of
twelve Communist leaders under the Smith Act17 and the declara-
tion of the Attorney General that the Communist Party was a
"subversive" organization,18 the defendant refused to ans'Ver
these questions on the ground that the answers might tend to
incriminate her. Granting her the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation, the court declared that the answers to the prosecution's
questions would have furnished a'link in the chain of evidence
needed for her prosecution for violation of the Smith Act.19
81st Cong., 2d Sess. 143 (1950). This quotation also appears in McCarran,
The Internal Security Act of 1950, 12 U. or PITT. L. REv. 481 (1951).
15. 340 U.S. 159 (1950).
16. United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir 1950) aff'd 341 U.S.
494 (1951). The indictment charged: "... [T]he defendant herein has been
a member of said Communist Party of the United States of America ...
while knowing that it taught and advocated violent overthrow of the govern-
ment." N.Y. Times, July 21, 1948, p. 3, col. 1.
17. 54 STAT. 671, §§ 2, 3 (1940), as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (Supp.
1950). Formerly, the Act had been invoked only in the cases of Dunne V.
United States, 138 F.2d 137 (8th Cir. 1943), ce'rt. denied, 320 U.S. 790(1943) and United States v. McWilliams, 163 F.2d 695 (D.C. Cir. 1947).
At the end of 1950, thirty-one states and territories had anti-sedition laws
similar to the Smith Act, twenty had criminal syndicalism laws, sixteen had
criminal anarchy laws. A total of thirty-nine jurisdictions had one or more
of these laws on the books. In addition thirty-four had red flag laws. For
a collection of these statues, see GELLHORN, THE STATES AND SUBvEnsIoN,
Appendices A and B (1952). See also Prendergast, State Legislatures and
Communism: The Current Scene, 44 A. Poi. Sci. REV. 556 (1950); Note,
Conduct Proscribed as Promoting Violent Overthrow of the Government,
61 HARv. L. REv. 1215 (1948).
Anti-sedition ordinances have also been adopted by a number of munici-
palities. A rather extreme one is that of Lafayette, Indiana (Ordinance No.
1015, adopted 1950), which provides in part as follows:
Section 1. Hereafter it shall be unlawful for any person, group of per-
sons or corporation, either singly or collectively, to promote, advocate,
support, encourage, advertise, disseminate or otherwise advance either by
words, signs, gestures, writings, pictures or other form of communica-
tion the ideology known as Communism as herein defined.
Section 2. Any person guilty of violation of any provision of this
ordinance shall be published by a fine of not more than $500.00 or by
imprisonment for not more than 180 days or by both such fine and im-
prisonment.
EmERSON AND HABER, POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES
463 n.5 (1952).
18. 5 CODE FED. REGS., app. A, p. 205 (1949), under President Truman's
Loyalty Program, 3 CODE FED. REGS. p. 129 (Supp. 1947).
19. Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 159, 161 (1950).
Under the Smith Act the crime consists of three "links": (1) to organ-
ice or be a member of a group (2) knowing (3) that it teaches or advocates
the violent overthrow of the government. The first link is found by an
admission of membership in the party. The second link is a jury finding
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The McCarran Act is another source of possible indictment
and conviction of members of the Communist Party.20 In the
light of these factors, it appears that a publication that a person
is a Communist could well be considered slander per se as imput-
ing a crime, although currently mere membership in that party
is not a crime because no valid statute has expressly made such
membership criminal.2l Even discounting these considerations,
however, it is quite possible that such publication would be
deemed slander per se under another category of that tort, i. e.,
the imputation to a person of conduct, characteristics, or a con-
dition incompatible with the proper exercise of his lawful busi-
ness, trade, profession or office.22
In any event, in view of the above discussion, the correctness
of the decision in the principal case holding the label of Com-
munist to be defamatory as a matter of law seems evident.
of scienter. The third link is supplied by the Court's sustaining the conclu-
sion in the case of Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 498 (1951), that
"the general goal of the Party was . . . to achieve a successful overthrow
of the existing order by force and violence."
In several cases the courts rejected the privilege to refuse to answer
questions concerning Communist affiliations under the First Amendment.
Lawson v. United States, 176 F.2d 49, 51-52 (D.C. Cir. 1949), cert. denied,
339 U.S. 934 (1950) ; Eisler v. United States, f70 F.2d 273, 279 (D.C. Cir.
1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 883 (1949) ; Barsky v. United States, 167 F.2d
241, 244-250 (D.C. Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 843 (1948), rehearing
denied, 339 U.S. 971 (1950) ; United States v. Josephson, 165 F.2d 82, 90-92
(2d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 838 (1948).
20. INTERNAL SECURITY ACT, 50 U.S.C. § 741 (1950). Section 4 (a) of
that Act declares it a crime for persons (1) "knowingly" (2) "to combine"
(3) "to perform any act which would substantially contribute to the estab-
lishment within the United States" of a foreign-dominated dictatorship.
Section 3 defines a "Communist-action organization," which is required to
register, as one "substantially" under the control of the foreign-dominated
world Communist movement as declared in its preamble.
Since admission of membership in the Communist Party by registration
would be in effect admitting the second and third elements of the crime
defined in Section 4 (a), a person registering could quite reasonably fear
prosecution based solely on the McCarran Act.
It is interesting to note that the courts of two states have declared
Communist registration ordinances to be violations of state constitutional
provisions against self-incrimination. Maryland v. Perdew, 19 U.S.L. WEEK
2357 (1951); People v. McCormick, 228 P.2d 349 (Cal. 1951).
Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 137 (e), (g) (1946), which provides for depor-
tation of aliens affiliated with groups which advocate violent overthrow of
the government, Communists have been denied citizenship and have been
deported. See grand jury investigation referred to in Estes v. Potter, 183
F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 1950), rert. denied, 340 U.S. 920 (1951).
21. It is at least arguable that the Smith Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2385, par. 3
(Supp. 1950), attempts to do so.
22. In tke case of Wright v. Farm Journal, 158 F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 1947),
the court held that the publication that a labor union president was a
Communist was libelous per se as affecting him adversely in his occupation
and profession.
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